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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE lVIEDICAL EMERGENCY STATUTE SPECIFIES ONLY THE TYPE OF 
COVERAGE A MOTOR VEHICLE POLICY MUST INCLUDE 
The Medical Emergency statute ("U.C.A. §31A-22-303(1)(a)(v)") at issue, as 
amended, is not ambiguous and specifies only the type of coverage automobile policies 
must contain. It does not confer any substantive rights or alter tort law. That statute 
provides: 
(l)(a) In addition to complying with the requirements of Chapter 21, 
Insurance Contracts in General, and Chapter 22, Part 2, Liability Insurance in 
General, a policy of motor vehicle liability coverage under Subsection 31(A)-22-
302(l){a) shall: 
(v) cover damages or injury resulting from a covered driver of 
a motor vehicle who is stricken by an unforeseeable paralysis, 
seizure, or other unconscious condition and who is not reasonably 
aware that paralysis, seizure, or other unconscious condition is about 
to occur to the extent that a person of ordinary prudence would not 
attempt to continue driving. 
(b) The driver's liability under Subsection (l)(a)(v) is limited to 
the insurance coverage. 
If the statute is "unambiguous", then the Court need look no further than the plain 
language of the statute. Wilcox v. CSK, 70 P.3d 85, ,rs (UT 2003). 
"When interpreting a statute, our goal is to give effect to the legislature's 
intent and purpose." .... "To determine that intent, we look to the plain 
language of the statute, reading it as a whole and interpreting its provisions 
to ensure harmony with other provisions in the same chapter and related 
chapters." . . . . "In doing so, we seek to render all parts thereof relevant and 
meaningful, and we accordingly avoid interpretations that will render 
portions of the statute superfluous or inoperative." .... "Discerning the plain 
meaning of a term may start with the dictionary, since it catalogues "a 
range of possible meanings that a statutory term may bear." But if the 
statutory language remains ambiguous, we may resort to other indications 
of legislative intent, including legislative history and policy consideration." 
(Emphasis added). 
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Craig v. Provo City (2015 UT App.145, 15). 
The plain language of the statute, as well as other chapters of the insurance code 
supports Lancer's position that the Medical Emergency statute only describes the type of 
coverage a policy must contain. It does not provide for strict liability or confer any other 
substantive rights. The preamble to the Medical Emergency statute, §31A-22-303(l)(a) 
establishes this and provides: 
In addition to complying with the requirements of Chapter 21, Insurance 
Contracts in General, and Chapter 22, Part II, Liability Insurance in General, a 
policy of motor vehicle liability coverage under §31A-22-302{l)(a) shall ... 
"Shall" refers to the requirements of various sections of the Medical Emergency statute 
and cross-references this statute with §31A-22-302(l)(a)-Required components of motor 
vehicle insurance policies-Exceptions (the "Component statute"). When read as a whole, 
the Medical Emergency statute supports Lancer's position that it only addresses the type 
of coverage a motor vehicle liability policy is required to have and the allowable 
exclusions and limitations. For example: subsection (l){a)(i) addresses the necessary 
policy information such as: the purchaser of the policy, the named insured and their 
address, the coverage afforded, the premium charged, the policy period, and the liability 
limits; Subsection (l)(a)(ii)(A)(B) discusses the requirements of an owner's policy versus 
an operator's policy and the differences, respectively; Subsection (I)( a)(iii) addresses 
resident relative status; Subsection (l)(a)(iv) addresses the legal effect of step-down 
provisions; Subsection (l)(a)(v), the section at issue, requires that a policy include 
coverage for an unforeseen medical emergency resulting in injury. Other sections 
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address different types of policies and the relationship to motor vehicle liability coverage, 
such as prorating insurance, adding additional coverage to the basic coverage and 
limiting coverage to a motor vehicle business (2)(a)(i)(ii)(iii), respectively. The point 
being that §3 lA-22-303(1) (a), addresses the type of allowable coverages, limitations and 
exclusions in motor vehicle liability policies. It does not address the substantive issues or 
the application of that coverage to a specific event. 
In addition, the Medical Emergency and Component statutes cross-reference each 
other and outline the required components for motor vehicle insurance policies. The 
Component statute provides that: 
(1) Every policy of insurance or combination of policies purchased to satisfy the 
owner's or operator's security requirements of Section 41-12a-301 shall include: 
(a) motor vehicle liability coverage under Sections JlA-22-303 and 3 lA-22-
304; 
(b) uninsured motorist coverage under Section 3 lA-22-305; 
(c) underinsured motorist coverage under Section 3 lA -22-305.3; and 
( d) ... personal injury protection under Sections 3 lA-22-306 through 3 IA-22-
309. (Emphasis added). 
The Medical Emergency statute, an amendment to §31-22-303, only requires that 
there be coverage for an unforeseen medical emergency as another necessary 
component of a motor vehicle liability policy. 
The plain language of the statute when read in conjunction with other 
insurance code provisions supports Lancer's position that the Medical Emergency 
statute unambiguously describes only those coverages a motor vehicle liability 
policy must have. This is also supported by the Utah Court of Appeals' decision 
in State v. Biggs, 167 P.3d 544, -,J 15 (UT. App. 2007) which confirms that the 
-3-
Medical Emergency statute "simply specifies what coverage a vehicle insurance 
policy must include in order to satisfy the Motor Vehicle Insurance Code 
Requirements". See also Judge Christine Johnson's ruling on the Injured Parties 
motion for summary judgment in the state court action: "[i]t simply directs that 
insurance policies for motor vehicles must include coverage for damages resulting 
from drivers who suffer from an unforeseeable unconscious condition." (R.71). 
Contrary to the Injured Parties position the Medical Emergency statute is not 
ambiguous and simply directs that motor vehicle liability policies provide coverage for 
injuries and damages resulting from drivers who suffer an unforeseen medical condition. 
POINT II 
FOR RECOVERY THE MEDICAL EMERGENCY STATUTE 
REQUIRES PROOF OF FAULT 
The Injured Parties contend that the "shall cover" language in the Medical 
Emergency statute "imposes liability on an incapacitated driver with no consideration of 
whether the driver was negligent or not." (Injured Parties' Opening Brief at 9-10). The 
Injured Parties draw a distinction between using the word "cover" ("coverage") in this 
section of the statute rather than the word "insure" ("insurance") found in other sections 
of the statute to support their position that the Medical Emergency statute imposes strict 
liability on a driver who suffers an unforeseen medical emergency. This is a "distinction 
without a difference," which the Insured Parties apparently agree with. (See Injured 
Parties' Opening Brief at 12.). The Injured Parties are advocating for the use of the term 
"coverage" to support their position that the Medical Emergency statute establishes strict 
liability, negating any requirement they prove fault. 
-4-
The legislature, however, expressly stated during the floor debates discussing the 
Medical Emergency statute that "this particular addition to the law does not circumvent 
the tort law that exists now .... " (Emphasis added). (Exhibit 1: Transcript of Floor 
Debates: 6:6-11 ). As such, the Medical Emergency statute is a coverage statute and only 
describes the type of coverages all motor vehicle liability policies must have. The intent 
was not to create a cause of action for strict liability. This is apparent from the use of the 
term "cover" in that statute which suggests that it is the insurance policy which forms the 
contractual relationship between the insured and the insurer and that determines the 
~ application of the coverage to a specific event, not the statute. 
The terms ''cover" and "coverage" have a specific meaning under the policy and 
Utah case law. These terms refer to the duties owed under a liability insurance policy by 
the insurer to the insured; referring to the duty to defend those risks within the coverage 
of the policy and the duty to indemnify if they can show legal entitlement to damages 
under the policy. Benjamin v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 140 P.3d 1210 ,r,r 14-17, 22, 27-29, 32 
(UT. 2004). 
The Injured Parties agree that the policy and Utah case law establish the meaning 
of the words "cover"/"coverage", specifically referring to the insurer's duties to defend 
and indemnify if an insured becomes legally liable. (the Injured Parties' Opening Brief, 
Id. 17). In this case, the Injured Parties are asserting the duty to indemnify. Yet, they have 
no contractual relationship to Lancer, as such the duty to indemnify does not arise until 
the Injured Parties obtain a judgment. (Benjamin, ,r,r 14, 17, 27). The Injured Parties are 
not the insureds. 
-5-
The insurance policy governs when the insurer's duty to indemnify is triggered. 
Benjamin, at ,r 27. "Typically, an insured's legal liability for damages arises when 
judgment is entered against him." Id.,I 291• Lancer's duty to indemnify does not arise 
until such a judgment is entered under the policy covering the Injured Parties claims 
against the alleged tortfeasors, Debra Jarvis and Lake Shore Motor Coach lines Inc. 
("Lake Shore"). 
Coverage pursuant to the Lancer policy is governed by Section II-Liability 
Coverage, which provides: 
A. Coverage 
We will pay all sums an "insured" legally must pay as damages because 
"bodily injury" or "property damage" to which this insurance applies. 
Caused by an "accident" and resulting from the ownership, maintenance or 
use of a covered "auto." 
We have the right and duty to def end any "insured" against a "suit" asking 
for such damages .... 
This provision mirrors that found in §31A-22-303(ii)(A) which provides that an owner's 
policy shall, amongst other provisions, insure " against loss from the liability imposed 
by law ( which is similar to the "legally must pay" language in the Lancer policy ) for 
damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the~e motor vehicles .... 
(Emphasis added). Again requiring that the Injured Parties show that they are "legally 
entitled" to damages under the policy, when there is a judgment entered against the 
tortfeasors. 
1 This is a third party case, so the Injured Parties have no contractual relationship with 
Lancer. As such, Lancer's legal liability doesn't arise until a judgment is entered against 
its insureds, Debra Jarvis and Lake Shore. 
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There is no language in the Medical Emergency statute that allows for strict 
liability and supports the Injured Parties' position that they are entitled to recover without 
proof of fault. This would be in violation of basic negligence law. In Speros, the Utah 
·Supreme Court interpreted §31A-22-303 and determined that "its provisions mandate 
coverage for liabilities imposed by existing tort law and do not create new liabilities. See 
Speros at~ 43 (holding that §3 lA-22-303 "requires coverage for all liabilities imposed by 
law," whether they rise out of negligence or intentional acts). See Randle v. Allen, 862 
P.2d 1329, 1335 (UT. 1993) (holding there is no tort liability for personal injury "absent 
-iJ fault or negligence on the part of the defendant."). Also, the language doesn't create an 
extra-contractual duty obligating Lancer to pay the Injured Parties who have not yet 
proven the insured's legal liability.2 
Under the terms and conditions of the policy the Injured Parties still have to 
establish there is coverage by showing "legal entitlement" before there is any duty to 
indemnify. To show "legal entitlement" still requires they prove fault. 
POINT III 
THERE IS NO AMBIGUITY SO LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
IS NOT APPLICABLE 
In the alternative, if there is an ambiguity, the Injured Parties request that the 
Court refer to legislative history to interpret the Medical Emergency statute to support 
their position that strict liability applies and they don't have to prove fault. A court may 
not, however, consider legislative history unless the plain meaning of the statute is 
2 The Injured Party has no direct right of action against the insurer, Speros, citing to Utah 
Code Ann. §31A-22-201. 
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"ambiguous" or would "work an absurd result," neither of which applies to the Medical 
Emergency statute. LPI Servs. v. McGee, 215 P.3d 135, iI 11 (UT. 2009). 
Furthermore, courts do not favor the use of legislative history to show legislative 
intent. The Utah Supreme Court in Graves v. Northeastern Services, Inc., 345 P.3d 619, 
,I75 (UT. 2015) expressed concern over the use oflegislative history, noting that the 
search for legislative intent is perilous for the following reasons: 
[I]n many cases, it is difficult to discover the motives, which may have 
prompted those who drew up the text; but it is also dangerous to construe 
upon supposed motives, if they are not plainly expressed. Everyone is apt 
to substitute what his motives would have been, or perhaps, unconsciously, 
to fashion the supposed motives according to his own interest and views of 
the case; and nothing is a more ready means to bend laws, charters, wills, 
treatises etc., according to preconceived purposes, then by their 
construction upon supposed motives. To be brief, unless motives are 
expressed, it is exceedingly difficult to find them out, except by the text 
itself; they must form, therefore, in most cases, a subject to be found out by 
the text, not the ground on which we construe it. 
Judge Johnson in her June 6, 2014 ruling on the Injured Parties' motion for 
summary judgment in the state court, noted that: "the use of isolated quotes from floor 
debates to divine the intent of the legislature as a whole is problematic, at best " citing to 
Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222,237 (1984). Specifically, that: 
Oral testimony of witnesses and individual Congressmen, unless very 
precisely directed to the intended meaning of particular words in a statute, 
can seldom be expected to be as precise as the enacted language itself. To 
permit what we regard as clear statutory language to be materially altered 
by such colloquies, which often take place before the bill has achieved its 
final form, would open the door to the inadvertent or perhaps even planned 
undermining of the language actually voted on by congress and signed into 
law[.] 
(R. 70-71). 
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The Injured Parties cite to various statements made during the floor debates which 
resulted in the Medical Emergency statute. Noteworthy, none of these cites shows any 
discussion of the use of the words "cover''/ "coverage and "insure/insurance". Because 
these words were not addressed no precise meaning can be attributed to them. As such, 
one can only guess the intentions of the legislators in using the different verbiage in the 
statute (§3 IA-22-303). 
Also, the Injured Parties selection of excerpts from the floor debates does not 
support their position that the Medical Emergency statute establishes strict liability, but to 
the contrary, the floor debates expressly state that it doesn't alter tort law. For example, 
the Injured Parties cite to these passages: 
.... we have case law in a number of different situations that the juries and 
judges have ruled that there is no liability when there's an unforeseen 
medical problem occurring with a driver. 
(Exhibit 1: Transcript of Floor Debates: 4: 24-25; 5: 1-2). 
Right now the law indicates that the only way you can recover damages, 
either liability or property damage is to prove that there was negligence 
involved. And in the case of medical-unforeseen medical problems, the 
courts have ruled that-that is not negligence, it was unforeseen, 
.. unpredictable and, in some cases unavoidable. 
(Exhibit 1: Transcript of Floor Debates: 5: 24-25; 6: 1-5). 
The Injured Parties rely on these passages to show that the intent of the legislature was 
for the Medical Emergency statute to allow strict liability in circumstances of an 
unforeseen medical problem. Nowhere is that discussed in the floor debates. In fact, the 
floor debates indicate that in enacting the Medical Emergency statute, the legislature 
specifically stated that the intent was not to "circumvent tort law". Specifically, stating 
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that: "this particular addition to the law does not circumvent the tort law that exists now, 
that you still have the opportunity to resort to the court law, ... But in the case of an 
unforeseen medical problem, this would limit the payout to the amount of the insurance 
coverage." (Exhibit 1: Transcript of Floor Debates: 6: 6-11). The express intent of the 
Medical Emergency statute was not to alter tort law by establishing strict liability, but to 
provide coverage for a unforeseen medical emergency, and as with all policies, limit the 
payout to the amount of insurance coverage. 
Judge Johnson reached the same conclusion in her June 16, 2014 ruling that the 
use of floor debates and similar sources of legislative history are not relied upon when the 
language of the statute itself is clear. (R. 71 ). In discussing the statute at issue, Judge 
Johnson determined that the plain language of Subsection (v) "is not ambiguous". "It 
simply directs that insurance policies for motor vehicles must include coverage for 
damages resulting from drivers who suffer from an unforeseeable unconscious 
condition". (R. 71). 
Judge Johnson concluded, as did Lancer, that "Subsection (v) ... by its own terms 
.. .it applies to the obligations of an insurer to provide coverage .... " (R.74). As such, the 
Medical Emergency statute only described the type of coverage necessary it has no effect 
on tort law, nor does it alter tort law, by creating a cause of action for strict liability. 
The statute at issue is not ambiguous, the plain meaning of the statute is to provide 
for the type of coverages to be included in motor vehicle liability policies. Because the 
statute is not ambiguous the use of legislative history to show intent and/or the use of 
floor debates is not appropriate. More importantly, the statute at issue when read as a 
- 10 -
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whole is in a section of the insurance code which addresses the type of coverages and 
limitations and exclusions allowable and required in motor vehicle liability policies. 
Nowhere in that statute does it mention, discuss or address strict liability or any other 
issues concerning tort law. As such, these sections do not support the Injured Parties' 
position, and are not relevant. Most significantly, the floor debates expressly state that 
the Medical Emergency statute is not intended " to circumvent tort law". 
POINT IV 
THE INJURED PARTIES ARE ONLY ENTITLED TO THE STATUTORY 
MINIMUM, IF ANYTHING 
If the Court agrees with Lancer's position that the Medical Emergency statute only 
specifies the type of coverage that a motor vehicle liability policy must provide and that 
the Sudden Incapacity defense is good law, then the Injured Parties are not entitled to 
damages. Under the reasoning in Speros, however, the Injured Parties may be entitled to 
the statutory minim1un of $25k. (§3 lA-22-304). 
The Injured Parties take issue with that and maintain that because Lake Shore is a 
motor carrier as defined by U.C.A §72-9-102(4) it is subject to different minimum 
insurance requirements, in this case a statutory minimum of $7 50k. (Admin. Code R909-
l-3 (2)). This minimum, however, applies only to a private motor carrier, "not a for hire 
motor carrier". Lake Shore is not a private carrier, but a "for hire" carrier, and as such, 
the 750k minimum does not apply. (Admin. Code R909-J-3(1)(2)). 
The Injured Parties are aware that Lake Shore, a motor carrier, is "for hire" and is 
~ not a private motor carrier. This is evidenced by the Injured Parties complaints filed in 
the state court actions wherein they alleged "the Alpine School District contracted with 
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defendant Lake Shore to transport the American Fork High School band by bus to and 
from a band competition in Idaho." (Emphasis added). (Exhibit 2: The Injured Parties' 
Complaints filed in the state court action, General Allegations 17 and R.47-48). It 
follows, then, that if a minimum applies it is the $25k statutory minimum. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Lancer requests this Court find that: ( 1) the Sudden Incapacity defense is good 
law, that tort law does not impose liability absent fault; (2) the Medical Emergency 
statute is not ambiguous, and describes only the type of coverage a inotor vehicle liability 
policy must contain; (3) the Medical Emergency statute is not ambiguous so legislative 
construction and history is not necessary; ( 4) the Medical Emergency statute at issue does 
not create a cause of action for strict liability; ( 5) the policy language controls any right 
of indemnification; and ( 6) if the Injured Parties are entitled to any recovery, it is limited 
to the statutory minimum of $25k. 
DATED this ~'1iay of July, 2016. 
64/H,,;/ 
Barbara L. Maw 
Attorney for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Transcript of the floor debates. 
2. The Crane, Hutchison, Seppi and Thayne Complaints filed in the state court 
actions. 
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1 in? 
2 SENATOR JONES: We--we have put it back in. 
3 On the last line of that amendment sheet, we've put it 
4 back in with a proper reference of one in parentheses, 
5 A in parentheses and iv in parentheses. And that's 
6 the only change. The wording of the--of the original 
7 amendment remains the same. 
8 SENATOR STEINER: I'm--I'm troubled by the 
9 fact that you would limit the driver's liability. I 
10 mean, it's a very difficult problem if someone has a 
11 paralysis, say, that suddenly strikes them, they have 
12 no warning, and they have an accident. And what 
13 happens if that person hit a child who's going to need 
14 services for the rest of their lives? 
15 You're deciding here--are you deciding here 
16 that the--the driver won't have to contribute to that, 
17 once his insurance company has paid off? 
18 SENATOR JONES: That's an excellent question, 
19 and according to the existing law if' we use the 
20 scenario you described, if we hit a child and had a 
21 medical problem with a driver, the driver would not be 
22 held liable for any--any coverage, not even his 
23 insurance coverage. 
24 And we have case law in a number of different 
25 situations that the juries and the judges have ruled 
4 
1 that there's no liability when there's an unforeseen 
2 medical problem occurring with a driver. And so my 
3 bill is changing that to put a liability on the 
4 driver, but only up to the maximum amount of the 
5 insurance on the vehicle. So we believe that it's a 
6 good bill from that aspect, that the in--injured party 
7 would at least recover the amount of the insurance; 
8 whereas, existing law they would not recover anything. 
9 And, of course, to the victim--regardless of 
10 why the driver caused the damage, the victim still 
11 suffers the damage. And so we believe this will 
12 correct a loophole in that law that needed to be 
13 closed. 
14 PRESIDENT: Question, Senator Wharton? 
15 SENATOR WHARTON: Yield to a question? 
16 SENATOR JONES: I -will. 
17 SENATOR WHARTON: Can you give me a scenario 
18 of the way the law is now and then how it would be 
19 when your--if this bill is passed? Because a lot of 
20 us are confused over here exactly--you're saying that 
21 right now--well, could you give me--yeah, could you 
22 try that and then maybe that will help us? 
23 SENATOR JONES: I'll be glad to give 
24 examples. Right now the law indicates that the only 
25 way you can recover damages, either liability or 
5 
1 property damage, is to prove that there was negligence 
2 involved. And in the case of medical--unforeseen 
3 medical problems, the courts have ruled that--that 
4 that is not negligence, it was unforeseen, 
5 unpredictable and, in some cases, unavoidable. 
6 And remembering that--that this particular 
7 addition to the law does not circumvent the tort law 
8 that exists now, that you still have the opportunity 
9 to resort to the court law, if you want to. But in 
10 the case of unforeseen medical problems, this would 
11 limit the payout to the amount of insurance covered. 
12 I'm not sure--was there something else in 
13 your question that I needed to address? 
14 SENATOR WHARTON: So--so you're saying right 
15 now--if you get in an accident and there's some 
16 unforeseen medical costs down the road, you're saying 
17 right now I can't sue you--if you did that to--to me, 
18 I can't sue you for those damages right now? Is that 
19 what you're saying? 
20 SENATOR JONES: That's true. And let--let me 
21 give you an--an ex--a real-time example. The one--and 
22 I have several of them here in my portfolio that I 
23 could cite, but I won't bore your with them. But I 
24 think one that's very important, a 23-year-old young 
25 man was driving down the street, lost control of his 
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CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
ss. 
I, JENNIFER.A. RUSSELL, a Registered 
Professional Reporter within and for the State of 
Utah, do hereby certify: 
That the foregoing tape-recorded proceedings 
were transcribed .into typewriting under my direction 
and supervision and that the foregoing pages contain a 
true and correct transcription o~ said proceedings to 
the best of my ability to do so. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto 
subscribed my name this 14th day of June .2016. 
JEN 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELIZABETH HUTCIDSON, an 
individual, 
vs. 
Plaintiff, 
DEBRA KAY JARVIS, an individual; 
LAKE SHORE MOTOR COACH LINES, 
INC., a corporation; and LANCER 
INSURANCE COMP ANY, an Illinois 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
SECOND AlVIENDED COMPLAINT AND 
DEMAND FOR JURY 
TRIAL 
Tier3 
Civil: 130100101 
ge. Clnisthre Jolmson 
COl\ffiS NOW, Plaintiff, Elizabeth Hutchison, by and through her attorneys, 
Michael Esplin, and Laura Cabanilla, and for cause of action against defendants alleges 
and avers as follows: 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1 
. - ~ . . . - ... ··-- I 
l fi 
I 
I 
i 
'~ 
I 
1. ·This Court·hasjurisdictionpursuant to tf.C.A:. ·§78A--S--=1G2("1): 
-· - - -·---··-----¾.--Venue-is-p:ooper--in.-this-Court.pursuant to_U:~G.-.A!...§7!1}-~ ... g07 ~ipce ~ef~dant 
- -- ·- ...... ··- •- .. -·--- ·- - -
I~ 
········ .. ___ __/. 
·I:>ebra-I&y-Jarv-is-is-a-1:es-icfont-sf..Uta.h..County.,_State_oflltah,..an_g_L_ak ___ e __ S __ h~. o ...,.r~~-M=•;;;;..ot~Qr=----___ 1 
Coach Lines, Inc. is a corporation doing business in Utah County, State of Utah. Lancer 
Insurance Company is an Illinois corporation doing business in the State of Utah. 
PARTIES 
3. ELIZABETH HUTCHISON ("Hutchison'~ is an individual residing in Utah 
County, Utah. 
4. · LAKE SHORE MOTOR COACH LINES, INC. (''hereinafter referred to as 
"Lake Shore'~ is a. Utah corpo;ration.doing_l;>1;t$~~~ -~ Utah as Lake Shore Motor Coach 
•· ······ . ' ... ,· . ' ... ·•• .. 
Lines, Inc. 
5. DEBRA KAY JAR.VIS (hereinafter referre4 to as "Jarvis'? is an individual 
residing in Utah who at all times relevant herein was an employee and ag~t ~f defendant 
ore. 
6. LANCER INSURANCE CO1\.1P ANY (hereinafter referred to as "Lancer',) is. 
an insurance company doing business in the State of Utah which provided a policy of 
automobile insurance to Defendants Lake Shore and Jarvis. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
2 
------- .. , ·-··- ·-··------ ··----··· •• _,.. _____ .. _________ ~-••• 4 ....... - - •• ,. ............ - ... 
···•-··•·-····• ··--·----
j 
· .. -· · - - ·- · ·H -~-~---·· .. 7:- On October 10, 2009, the Alpine SchooH:>istrict·had·-contracted defendant Lake 
-·--- - - -----Shore-to-fxansp01:t-the-Am.em.can-BorkHigh_scho.olbandJ:iy_bJ!S to and from a b~cl 
-----· ----~ 
-- ......... --competition-in-Idah~----··-.:--..---------------
8. Defendant Jarvis was the driver/operator of defendant Lake Shore's bus and at 
all times relevant hereto was the agent and employee of defendant Lake Shore. 
9. Plaintiff was one of the student passengers being transported by defendant Lake 
Shore. 
10. ·Defendant Jarvis was driving the Lake Shore bus on I-15 freeway in Idaho 
returning-the passengers to Utah when she- lost control of the bus causing the bus to 
leave the roadway, travel over ao., embanlanent, _eventuaUy. ~hing on i~ si~e ca1:18ing; 
Plaintiff to suffer general and special damages as set forth below. 
11. Defendant Lancer was sent a written notice and claim against the policy of 
insurance insuring Lake Shore and Jarvis for damages caus~d by the bus accident on 
12. Defendant Lancer did not respond to the claims of the Plaintiff. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Negligence). 
13. The foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein by reference. 
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Telephone: 801.373.4912 
Facsimile: 801.371.6964 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TIFF ANY THAYNE, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DEBRA KAY JARVIS, an individual; 
LAKE SHORE MOTOR COACH LINES, 
INC., a coi:poration; and LANCER 
INSURANCE COMPANY, an.Illinois 
corporation, 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY 
TRIAL 
Tier3 
Civil: 
Judge: 
@ ----==========D===e=-fe=nd=an=ts-=·-===-=~-----------------,--...J-
CO1\.1ES NOW, Plaintiff; Tiffany Thayne, by and through her attomey, Michael 
Esplin, and for cause of action against defendants alleges and avers as follows: 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A §78A-5-102(1). 
1 
2. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to U.C.A. §78B-3-307 since defendant 
Debra Kay J~is is a resident of Utah County, State of Utah, and Lake Shore Motor 
··· · CoacEl:;mes~ Inc. ·ts· a ·corporation domg· bttsmess· m Utah Counfy ;·-state o 
Insurance Company is an Illinois corporation doing business in the State of Utah. 
PARTIES 
3. TIFF ANY 1HA YNE ("Thayne") is an individual residing in Utah County, 
Utah. 
4. LAKE SHORE MOTOR COACH LINES, INC. ("hereinafter referred to as 
"Lake Shore") is a Utah corporation doing business in Utah as Lake Shore Motor Coach 
Lines, Inc . 
. 5. DEBRA KAY.JARVIS (hereinafter referred to as "Jarvis") is an individual 
residing in Utah who at all times relevant herein was an employee and agent of defendant 
Lake Shore. 
6. LANCER INSURANCE COMPANY (hereinafter referred to as ''Lancer") is 
an insurance company doing business in the State of Utah which provided a policy of 
automobile insurance to Defendants Lake Shore and Jarvis. 
2 
... ···- . .. . ... ·1"' 
- ... ··-· ---------- --·--··-·-·•· 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
7. On October 10, 2009, the Alpine School District had contracted defendant Lake 
· Shore to transport the American Fo:dcHigh school band by bus to and· 
competition in Idaho. 
8. Defendant Jarvis was the driver/operator of defendant Lake Shore's bus and at 
all times relevant hereto was the agent and employee of defendant Lake Shore. 
9. Plaintiff was one of the student passengers being transported by defendant Lake 
Shore. 
10. Defendant Jarvis was driving the Lake Shore bus on I-15 freeway in Idaho 
returning the passengers to Utah when she lost control of the bus causing the bus to 
leave the roadway, travel over an embanlanent, eventuaJ.;ty crashing on its side causing 
Plaintiff to suffer general and special damages as set forth below. 
11. Defendant Lancer was sent a written notice and claim against the policy of 
~-------------------------------------~ insurance insuring Lake Sho_re and Jarvis for damages caused by the bus accident on 
January 9, 2011. 
12. Defendant Lancer did not respond to the claims of the Plaintiff. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Negligence) 
13. The foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein by reference~ 
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:N.IICHAEL D. ESPLIN (1009) 
ESPLIN I WEIGHT 
290 West Center Street 
P.O.BoxL 
· · Provo, Utah 84603-0200 · · · · · -
~ Telephone: 801.373.4912 
Facsimile: 801.371.6964 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, AMERICAN FORK 
DEPARTMENT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JANNA CRANE, 
an individual, 
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 
AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Plaintiff, Tier 3 
vs. 
DEBRA KAY JARVIS, an individual; 
LAKE SHORE MOTOR COACH 
LINES, INC., a corporation; and 
an Illinois corporation, 
Defendants. 
Civil: 130100098 
Judge: Christine Johnson 
COMES NOW, Plaintiff, Janna Crane, by and through her attorney, Michael Esplin, 
and for cause of action against defendants alleges and avers as follows: 
1 
., 
· JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
I. This Comthasjurisclictionpursuantto U.C.A. §78A-5-102(1). 
........... .i. __ .. __ ... "• 
· 2.· Venue·is propet'in: tms·eouttJmrsuant·ra TT.CA. -§1&13-3'-3'C)7 •since defendant· · 
Debra Kay Jarvis is a resident of Utah County, State of Utah, and Lake Shore Motor 
Coach Lines, Inc. is a COlJ>oration doing business in Utah County, State of Utah. Lancer 
Insurance Company is an Illinois corporation doing business in the State of Utah. 
PARTIES 
3. JANNA CRANE ("Crane") is an individual residing in Utah County, Utah. 
4. LAKE SHORE MOTOR COACH LINES, INC. (''hereina:ft~ referred to as 
· .. · · · ''Lake· Shore") is a:Utah corporati.en doing business in Utah-as Lake-Shore,Motor Coaeh, • 
Lines, Inc. 
5. DEBRA KAY JAR VIS (hereinafter referred to as "Jarvis") is an indiyidual 
residing in Utah who at all times relevant ~erein was an employee and agent of defendant 
Lake Shore. 
6. LANCER INSURANCE COMP ANY (hereinafter referred to as "Lancer'') is 
an insurance company doing business in the State of Utah which provided a policy of 
automobile insurance to Defendants Lake Shore and Jarvis. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
2 
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·-- -·--- -- ·- ~ ... · ·?." ·01rOctober 10, 2009, the Alpine School District had-contracted defendant Lake 
Shore to transport the American Fork High school band by bus to and from a band 
.. -• • "'••••--••&•>,····"· .. -·••••·• -••• ---• -~··-••·., .. - .... ••••-•H• •- • ➔ , ..... ·• ••~••>> __ ,, .. ,, ••• •-- .. • ,,, ............... •••• __ ................. « .... _ ,.., .... ~ -•• >W•• •• ••-• ....... ,.~ .. -- ---• 
·· · competition: in Tdan'.o~ · "· · · · -
8. Defendant Jarvis was the driver/operator of defendant Lake Shore's bus and at 
all times relevant hereto was the agent and employee of defendant Lake Shore. 
9. Plaintiff was one of the student passengers being transported by defendant Lake 
Shore. 
10. Defendant Jarvis was driving the Lake Shore bus on I" 15 freeway in Idaho 
returning the passengers to Utah when she.lost control of the bus '?ausing the bus to 
· · .. '"leave the·roadway; travel'over.an:embankment, eventually crashing ·on its··side causing ··· ··· 
Plaintiff to suffer general and special damages .as set forth below. 
11. Defendant Lancer was sent a written notice and claim against the policy of 
insurance insming Lake Shore and Jarvis for damages caused by the bus accident on 
~---------------------------------------1.----1-
Febl"U8I'Y 13, 2011. 
12. Defendant Lancer did not respond to the claims of the Plaintiff. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Negligence) 
13. The foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein by reference. 
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MICHAEL D. ESPLIN (1009) . 
ESPLIN I WEIGHT 
290 West Center Street 
P.O. BoxL 
Provo, Utah 84603-0200 
Telephone: 801.373.4912 
Facsimile: 801.371.6964 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MEITE SEPPI, an individ~, 
AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND 
Plaintiff, FOR JURY TRIAL 
vs. 
DEBRA KAY JARVIS, an individual; 
LAKE SHORE MOTOR COACH LINES, 
INC., a corporation; and LANCER 
INSURANCE COMP ANY, an Illinois 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
Tier 3 
Civil: 140400088 
Judge: Lynn W. Davis 
CO:tvlES NOW, Plaintiff, Mette Seppi, by and through her attorney, Michael Esplin, 
and for cause of action against defendants alleges and avers as follows: 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1 
'' --.·----··----- ....... _ ---... 
... -··----·· -·-·- ,. - -- .... ___ .. _. 
- ----·- ·---------------------------
.. 
.. 
1. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to U.CA. §78A-5-102(1 ). 
2. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to U.C.A. §78B-3-307 since defendant 
Coach Lines, Inc. is a corporation doing business in Utah <;!aunty, State of Utah. Lancer ~ 
Insurance Company is an Illinois corporation doing business in the State of Utah_. 
PARTIES 
3. MEITI SEPPI ("Seppi") is an individual residing in Utah County, Utah. 
4. LAKE SHORE MOTOR COACH LINES, INC. ("hereinafter referred to as 
"Lake Shore") is a Utah corporation doing· busin~s .. in Utali as Lake Shore.Motor Coach 
Lines, Inc. 
. -
•• ♦._ ••• .., • ♦ 4• I ; . ... '. . ..... -:-•-'I, ,:·'• ... -• .... 
5. DEBRA KAY JARVIS (hereinafter referred to as· CCJa.rvis'') is ~individual 
residing in Utah who at all times rel~vant herein w~ an employee and ag~t of defendant 
Lake Shore .. 
an insurance_ company doing business in the State of Utah which provided a policy of 
automobile :insurance to Defendants Lake Shore and Jarvis. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
2 
,;ii - ·-· 
.. 
.. 
, -----·------.. - -.... _ ... ,,. ... _ . .,_,.., ____ ., 
7. On October l 0, 2009, the Alpine School District had contraeted defendant Lake 
S.hore to transport the American Fork High school band by bus to and from a band 
=eompetitron"'i!f'Iclmrru.==-====-=========-=======--=======-=====-,.=====-==·===·===- .. 
8. Defendant Jarvis was the driver/operator of defendant Lake Shore's bus and at 
all times relevant hereto was the agent and employee of defendant Lake Shore. 
9. Plaintiff was one of the student passengers being transported by defendant Lake 
Shore: . 
l 0. Defendant Jarvis was driving the Lake Shore bus on I-15 freeway in Idaho 
returnkg the passengers to Utah when she lost ·control of the -bus causing the ·bus ~ 
leave the roadway, fl'avel ov~r an ~ankm~t, eventually cr~g on its side causing 
f.; 
Plamtiff to suffer general and ·special damages as set forth below. · 
11. Defendant Lancer has filed an action requesting declaratory judgment against 
- Plaintiff, plaintiffs in tbree.other.separat~ actions arising from the same a~ident and 
Central Division, Case No. 2:14-CV-00785. 
12. Defendant Lancer claims in ~e federal declaratory judgment action that 
Lancer should not be responsible to pay the _claims of Plaintiff. 
Fm.ST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Negligence) 
3 


